A Brief Description and Some Notes on the Battle of Maiwand:


by Fred Larimore.
comments to fbl@dca.net
Copyright © 1995-1997
Lost battles are usually a combination of a number of complex actions and decisions that occur along the timeline of these battles. The battle of Maiwand is certainly no exception, but it can be said that a major factor in the British defeat is a classic lack of information as to the size of the enemy force and it's disposition in relation to the British force throughout the entire battle timeline.

The battle of Maiwand was fought on the 27th of July 1880. [1] On the evening of the 26th, spies reported that a small body of the enemy were moving on the Maiwand Pass. General Burrows decided that he would move on the pass the next morning to, "turn out the few hundred Ghazis", who occupied it. General Burrow's force consisted of :
British Troops:

  • Infantry: 66th Regiment of Foot (473)
  • Artillery: "E" Battery "B" Brigade of the Royal Horse Artillery (146) (under Major Blackwood) and a Smooth-bore Battery (43).
    Indian Army Troops:
  • Cavalry: 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (315) and 3rd Sind Horse (260).
  • Infantry : 1st Bombay Native Infantry (Grenadiers) (649) and 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) (624).
  • Sappers and Miners: No. 2 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners (46).
    Staff:
  • General Burrow's staff was 9 officers.

    This force was 2,565 strong. They did have the problem of the added responsibility of guarding a large baggage train which General Burrows had decided to take with him as he had insufficient forces to leave it behind with an adequate guard. They were moving to meet an Afghan Army under Ayoub Khan variously estimated at between 12 to 20 thousand men with a large force of cavalry, estimated at a fourth of the total force.

    At half past six on the morning of the 27th of July General Burrows force marched for the Maiwand Pass weakened by sickness and the necessity of guarding the baggage. At ten o'clock a body of Afghan cavalry was sighted to the left front of the British advance. An officers was sent forward to reconnoiter and reported the cavalry to be retiring. Between the British and the Afghan positions was a broad "torrent-bed" which Lieutenant MacLaine crossed with two guns, eager to pursue the retreating Afghans. An order was sent to recall him, but the order was not followed. This resulted in two more guns and some cavalry being sent out to support him. Shortly, the entire Afghan Army was seen through the morning mist marching in a long line toward Kandahar.

    At first the fight was not general, but after about half an hour's maneuvering, the enemy began to appear in force on the British right and their fire gradually extended along the entire British line of advance. Simultaneously, swarms of armed villagers appeared on the right rear, while on the left flank, Ayoub's splendid cavalry kept up a succession of desperate charges. This fight continued for about three hours at the end of which about one fourth of the British force was hors de combat.

    At this point, the British position began to have serious problems on the left when two companies of Jacob's Rifles, who had lost all of their officers, except for one Indian officer, broke under the pressure of the Afghan fire. The fanatical Ghazis pressed forward with a charge and the British line simply, "curled up like a wave". Both regiments of Bombay Native Infantry now fell back in confusion on the position of the 66th Foot who found themselves pressed on by mixed masses of Ghazis and their own Native Infantry. The 66th Foot was forced to retire back into the enclosures and gardens on the other side of the dry torrent bed.

    It was here that the men of the 66th Foot (along with Maj. Blackwood) made a gallant stand, while the Native Infantry, who were now thoroughly disorganized, retired to Kandahar under pursuit of the Afghan cavalry. The 66th Foot, along with the Native Infantry that did not retire, were hard pressed and fought in a number of well organized and disciplined small groups. One party stood back to back and kept the Ghazis at bay until their numbers were so reduced that the remaining men rushed out and died in hand-to-hand fighting. Another party, retiring to a more defensible position behind a low wall, were eventually nearly all killed.

    The fight continued as a desperate struggle for survival for the rest of the day, all through the night, and until the evening of the next day. The path of retreat was now blocked by armed villagers and the Afghan cavalry. At 2 a.m. on the 28th of July, news of the disaster reached General Primrose via some of the Native cavalry. He at once ordered General Brooke with a relief force in the direction of the battlefield. But for this timely assistance, it is probable that none of General Burrow's force would have survived a retreat to Kandahar. As it was the force suffered a total of 44% casualties. The 66th Foot had 61 % casualties and E/B Royal Horse Artillery had 23% casualities. Two of the Horse Artillery guns and five of the smooth-bores were abandoned on the battlefield.


    [1] The details for this account of the Battle of Maiwand are collected from Maxwell, Leigh, My God-Maiwand! Operations of the South Afghanistan Field Force 1878-80, London : Leo Cooper, 1979 and a short typewritten account of the battle found loose in some bound copies of "Regiment Magazine" .
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